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Abstract: On Android, users can choose to install an application, or not, based on the per-
missions it requests. These permissions are later enforced on the application by the system, e.g.,
when accessing sensitive user data. In this work, we focus on the access to Wi-Fi related informa-
tion, which is protected by the ACCESS_WIFI_STATE permission. We show that this apparently
innocuous network related permission can leak Personally Identifiable Information (PII). Such
information is otherwise only accessible by clearly identifiable permissions (such as READ_PHONE-
_STATE or ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION or ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION). We analyzed permissions of
2700 applications from Google Play, and found that 41% of them use the ACCESS_WIFI_STATE per-
mission. We then statically analyzed 998 such applications and, based on the results, selected 88
for dynamic analysis. Finally, we conducted an online survey to study the user perception of the
privacy risks associated with this permission. Our results demonstrate that users largely underes-
timate the privacy implications of this permission, in particular because they often cannot realize
what private information can be inferred from it. Our analysis further reveals that some companies
have already started to abuse this permission to collect personal user information, for example,
to get a unique device identifier for tracking across applications or to geolocalize the user without
explicitly asking for the dedicated permissions. Because this permission is very common, most
users are potentially at risk. There is therefore an urgent need for modification of the privileges
granted by this permission as well as a more accurate description of the implications of accepting
a permission.
Key-words: Android Permissions, Wi-Fi related data, Privacy, Personally Identifiable Informa-
tion (PII) leakage, Static and Dynamic Analysis of Applications, User survey
WifiLeaks: Sous-estimation des implications en termes de
vie privée de l’autorisation ACCESS_WIFI_STATE
d’Android
Résumé : Avec Android, les utilisateurs peuvent choisir d’installer ou non une application en
fonction des permissions demandées par cette dernière. Ces permissions sont ensuite imposées à
l’application par le système d’exploitation, par exemple lors de l’accès à des données sensibles de
l’utilisateur. Dans ce travail nous nous intéressons à l’accès aux informations relatives au Wi-Fi,
accès protégé par la permission ACCESS_WIFI_STATE. Nous montrons que cette permission de
type réseau et d’apparence très anodine, peut être la cause de fuites d’informations personnelles
(PII), qui ne seraient sinon accessibles que par des permissions clairement identifiables (telles
que READ_PHONE_STATE ou ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION ou ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION). Nous avons
analysé les permissions de 2700 applications du marché Google Play, et nous avons trouvé que 41%
d’entres elles demandent la permission ACCESS_WIFI_STATE. Nous avons ensuite analysé de façon
statique 998 applications de cet ensemble, et en fonction des résultats, nous en avons sélectionné
88 pour une analyse dynamique plus poussée. Finallement nous avons conduit une enquête en
ligne pour étudier la perception qu’ont les utilisateurs des risques associés à cette permission.
Nos résultats démontrent que les utilisateurs sous estiment largement les implications en termes
de vie privée de cette permission, en particulier parce qu’ils ne peuvent pas réaliser quelles
informations privées peuvent en être tirées. Nos analyses montrent par ailleurs que certaines
sociétés ont commencé à abuser de cette permission pour collecter des informations personnelles,
par exemple pour obtenir un identifiant unique et stable du terminal à des fins de traçage, ou
pour géolocaliser l’utilisateur sans avoir à lui demander explicitement l’autorisation. Parce que
cette permission est très répendue, la plupart des utilisateurs courrent potentiellement un risque.
Il y a donc un besoin urgent de modifier les privilèges associés à cette permission ainsi que de
décrire plus précisement les implications que son acceptation peut avoir.
Mots-clés : Permissions Android, données relatives au Wi-Fi, Vie privée, fuites d’Information
Personnellement Identifiables (PII), Analyse statique et dynamique d’applications, Enquête util-
isateurs
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1 Introduction
Mobile devices have become ubiquitous and are crucial part of our lives today. This is mainly
due to the wide variety of functionalities they provide beyond telephony and Internet services,
being equipped with a lot of different kinds of sensors: e.g., GPS navigation unit, Camera,
Accelerometer. As these devices know the most about their users, they’ve invariably become the
most serious threat to user privacy invasion. Above all, since a better user profile can be created
with the help of vast amount of data available and accessible, Advertising and Analytics (A&A)
companies have shifted their focus from traditional desktop computers/browsers to applications
running on these devices.
Today a large fraction of mobile devices are running the Android OS. To control the access to
user data, it implements a permission system where a user needs to grant permissions required
by an application at installation time. The goal of this permission system is to let a user know in
advance the information an application would be able to access if installed. It is worth mentioning
that an application can only be installed if the user agrees with the required list of permissions.
However, this permission system has shown limitations. Due to a poor understanding of the
permission descriptions and a lack of attention given to these messages, many applications are
installed without the user really knowing about the kind of information applications would be
able to access [16]. In addition, the permission system sometimes fails to prevent the access to
sensitive data [23] allowing applications to access information without the need of corresponding
permission.
In this paper we focus on a peculiar permission, ACCESS_WIFI_STATE, that allows an applica-
tion to access various information related to the the Wi-Fi interface. This permission falls in the
‘network’ group of permissions [3] and is categorized as ‘normal’ (as compared to ‘dangerous’,
for example) based on the potential risk implied in the permission [2] and thereby most users
probably fail to see associated privacy risks.
In this paper we show that the reality is just opposite and that a plenty of user PII can be
(and are already) derived from the data accessible thanks to this permission. This is a severe
problem as the use of ACCESS_WIFI_STATE permission by advertising libraries has increased over
the time [10].
More specifically the contributions of this work are threefold:
1. First, we consolidate what PII can be derived from the data related to Wi-Fi interface
(Section 3), namely unique and stable identifiers (useful for tracking purposes), device
geolocation, travel history and social links between users. In addition, we also provide
details about the uniqueness of SSIDs by analyzing a worldwide database of free and paid
public Wi-Fi APs maintained by jiwire.com.
2. Then we analyze the current situation on the Google Play employing both a static and
dynamic analysis of Android applications (Section 4). We first show that a large proportion
of applications (41% of the 2700 Apps we analyzed) ask for this permission. While asking
for this permission can be justified in some categories of applications, it is not at all the
case in others. Going further into the details, we also reveal that a large number of both
first and third-parties have actually started to exploit this permission by directly accessing
or deriving various user PII from the Wi-Fi related data accessible to them thanks to this
permission.
3. Finally, we analyze the user perception of this permission using an online survey to which
156 Android users answered (Section 5). The results clearly demonstrate that users don’t
really understand the privacy implications of this permission. Changes in Android permis-
sion system are solicited to tackle this problem, for example, either by modifying the list
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Figure 1: Description of the ACCESS_WIFI_STATE permission as presented to a user.
of methods restricted by the permission or by displaying the appropriate message to the
user.
2 Background
2.1 Android permission system
The Android security architecture has two levels of protection: first, all the applications and
some parts of the system run as different Unix users, and secondly, applications must explicitly
ask the user for permissions.
The first level of protection prevents applications to sneak into each other or into the system
data/activity, since each application runs in its own process sandbox. The second level of pro-
tection comes into play as, by default, Android gives no privilege to applications. As Android
gives no privilege to applications by default, the second level of protection comes into play in
the form of permissions. Each application must ask the user for privileges by statically declaring
the list of permissions it requires. At installation time, the Android system prompts the user for
consent, and the installation completes only if the user agrees with it.
There are a total of 145 different permissions available (as of Android version 4.4) for an
application to ask for. Many of these permissions are required by applications to access user
sensitive information (e.g. ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION and READ_CONTACTS are the permissions
required to respectively geolocalize the device and read user’s contact data). The permissions
are also categorized, based on the associated potential risks, as either ‘normal’, ‘dangerous’,
‘signature’, or ‘signatureOrSystem’.
Since the kind of information exposed by a particular permission is not necessarily trivial
for the end user, each permission is accompanied by a short description. Figure 1 presents
the description of the ACCESS_WIFI_STATE permission as displayed to the user. This message
contains a title, a subtitle and a short description. The blue title indicates a broad categorization
of the permission, the subtitle is the text corresponding to the name of the permission, and the
description gives a short explanation of the privileges granted by the permission. Based on this
information, users are expected to be able to be able to decide whether a permission is really
required by an application.
2.2 The ACCESS_WIFI_STATE permission
The ACCESS_WIFI_STATE permission, falls in the group of ‘Network communications’. It grants
access to the data associated with the Wi-Fi interface, making some of the methods of the
WifiManager class [7] available to the application. These methods and their capabilities are
RR n° 8539
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Table 1: WifiManager’s method restricted by the ACCESS_WIFI_STATE permission.
Method name Description Retrievable Information
isWifiEnabled() Returns whether Wi-Fi is en-
abled or disabled.
Returns true if Wi-Fi is enabled.
getWifiState() Gets the Wi-Fi enabled state. Enabled, disabled, currently being
enabled or disabled, unknown
getConfiguredNetworks() Returns a list of all configured
networks.
For each configured net-
work/AP: SSID, allowed protocols
and security schemes
getConnectionInfo() Returns dynamic information
about the current Wi-Fi connec-
tion, if any is active.
About AP: BSSID, SSID, RSSI
About Device: Wi-Fi MAC ad-
dress, IP address
getScanResults() Returns the results of the last
AP scan.
For each AP: BSSID, SSID, signal
strength, channel, capabilities
getDhcpInfo() Returns the DHCP-assigned ad-
dresses from the last successful
DHCP request, if any.
IP address, DNS server address,
gateway and netmask
presented in table 1. It is worth mentioning that these methods only allow to read the data
associated with the Wi-Fi interface, but not to modify it: a different permission, CHANGE_WIFI-
_STATE, is required to change the state of the Wi-Fi interface.
After analyzing the potential risks implied by this permission, Google decided to characterize
it as ‘normal’ (we will see that this decision is highly questionable). Also, it is important to realize
that this is not the permission required for Internet access. INTERNET is the only permission
required to open a network socket to send or receive data over the network.
3 Inference of User PII from Wi-Fi related data
As we have seen, the ACCESS_WIFI_STATE permission enables an application to read data related
to the Wi-Fi configuration of the device. This raw data may look inoccuous, but it is actually
possible to infer several user PII. In this section we describe such user PII that can be either
directly accessed or derived from raw data related to Wi-Fi.
3.1 A unique device identifier
Using the getConnectionInfo() method, an application can obtain the MAC address of the
Wi-Fi interface, a 48-bit identifier that is unique to a device. A unique identifier permanently
attached to a device allows external entities to track user activities across all applications. And
since a single user is usually associated with a given device, it also enables to identify the user,
which explains why the Wi-Fi MAC address is considered as a user PII.
In fact, the Wi-Fi MAC address is not the only hardware-tied identifier available to be accessed
by applications on Android: for example applications having the READ_PHONE_STATE permis-
sion can access the IMEI and MEID. But the Wi-Fi MAC address is somehow unique among all
hardware-tied identifiers as it can also be used by trackers to link both the online and physical
profiles of the user. The Wi-Fi MAC address is used by tracking systems that monitor each
wireless channel to track individuals as they move in the physical world (e.g., in a retail store
of a shopping mall) [21, 14]. If in parallel it is also collected by applications, then it paves the
way for trackers to create a bigger profile based on both the online and physical activities of the
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user. Indeed, this technique can be used to detect the user and to serve targeted advertisement
in the physical world based on the online profile of the user [6]. It is quite evident from the above
discussion that the availability of Wi-Fi MAC address to advertisers is a serious threat to the
user privacy.
3.2 Geolocation
Geolocation is traditionally obtained using the GPS navigation unit consisting of a dedicated
GPS chip embedded in the device. However, Wi-Fi and GSM based geolocation systems have
seen wide deployment during last few years either to improve accuracy and decrease the first
fix time of the geolocation or as an alternative to the GPS. These systems use the information
about surrounding Wi-Fi APs (resp. GSM cell towers) to derive device geolocation.
The list of surrounding Wi-Fi APs can be obtained thanks to the ACCESS_WIFI_STATE per-
mission through the getScanResults() method of WifiManager class. For each access point in
range, the retrieved information includes: the BSSID (MAC address of the AP), the SSID (human
readable name), received signal strength, supported encryption schemes, operating channel, etc.
However, it is very important to mention here that a calling the getScanResults() method does
not launch the scanning of surrounding Wi-Fi APs, instead it returns the list of last scanned
Wi-Fi APs. As the list retrieved by the application might not be up-to-date, an application
might not always be able to derive the current device location. However, in practice, we notice
that Android system is doing the scan of surrounding Wi-Fi APs every 15 seconds1. Moreover,
there might be other applications or system components that trigger the scan in the meantime.
Therefore in practice the list of surrounding Wi-Fi APs is often up-to-date and an application
does not really need to start the scanning by itself.
By submitting the raw result of a Wi-Fi scan to a remote geolocation service (companies
like Google [5], Microsoft, Skyhookwireless and Apple, to name a few, provide such a service),
the device gets in return geolocation information (coordinates and accuracy metric). And the
precision in case of Wi-Fi based geolocation is quite accurate in cities: around 20 meters in urban
areas [18]. This is due to both the high density of Wi-Fi APs in urban areas and a coverage area
comparatively smaller than GSM Cell towers.
The Wi-Fi, GSM and GPS-based geolocation systems are actually employed by the Android
system. However applications can only access the geolocation provided by Android system if
they have ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION and ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION permissions that a user easily
understands.
On the opposite, the raw Wi-Fi scan information is a source of geolocation information that
is not protected by any of these two geolocation permissions. It is therefore possible for an
application to obtain geolocation information without having to explicitly ask for it through the
official ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION and ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION permissions. An application
can retrieve the raw Wi-Fi APs scan and query the remote geolocation service provided that
it is granted both the ACCESS_WIFI_STATE permission and the INTERNET permission. And
we will see in Section 4 that applications are often granted both the ACCESS_WIFI_STATE and
INTERNET permissions.
1We checked Android 4.1.1 and 4.4 source. The value of ‘config_wifi_supplicant_scan_interval’ present in
‘./frameworks/base/core/res/res/values/config.xml’ file is 15000 milliseconds. Of course, this value is subject to
be changed later by the manufacturers or carriers while distributing a modified copy of Android OS along with
the device. It can be either changed directly in the Android source or it can be set in device ‘build.prop’ file.
RR n° 8539
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3.3 Travel history
The list of Wi-Fi networks to which the device has been connected is stored in the Config-
ured Networks List that can be accessed through the getConfiguredNetworks() method of
WifiManager class. For each of these configured networks, the SSID is available along with
other information such as the supported security protocols and authentication algorithms. And
data stored in the Configured Networks List can be combined with external ressources to obtain
information such as the previously visited locations.
Indeed Wi-Fi AP mapping databases exist that store the geolocation coordinates of Wi-Fi
APs, along with other information [8]. The identifiers stored in the Configured Networks List
can be used to retrieve geolocation information from those databases [17]. In fact, only the
SSID of the configured networks seems to be available through the getConfiguredNetworks()
method2, and contrary to the BSSID it is not a unique identifier of Wi-Fi AP. Therefore, multiple
Wi-Fi APs can share the same SSID across the world potentially reducing the accuracy of the
geolocation information obtained from those databases.
To evaluate the accuracy of the SSID-based geolocation, we have analyzed a database of
free and paid public Wi-Fi hotspots spread over 123 countries. This database, obtained from
the Wi-Fi Finder application (from jiwire.com) has 5,28,994 entries of 3,16,792 distinct Wi-Fi
hotspots. Among these, 2,92,296 (92%) Wi-Fi hotspots have a unique SSID whereas 24,496 have
not. This clearly shows that most public Wi-Fi hotspots (both free and paid) have unique SSIDs,
ensuring that SSIDs of Wi-Fi hotspots found in the Configured Networks List can be linked, most
of the time, to a unique location.
3.4 Social links
Identifiers stored in the Configured Network List can also be used to infer ties between individuals.
Indeed, it has been shown that by comparing the list of SSIDs of Configured Network List on two
devices, it is possible to predict the existence of a social or professional link between the owners
of those devices [13]. By collecting this data on a large population, an application could gather
information that would make it possible for them to build a social network between their users.
The work presented in [13] relies only on the SSID, which is not a unique identifier and
can therefore lead to some limitations. However, the configured network list returned by the
Android system also contains some other information about the configured Wi-Fi AP such as
allowed protocols, authentication algorithms, key management, etc. This information could be
leveraged to improve the quality of the social link predictor.
3.5 Other PII derived from SSIDs
Untill this point, we have considered the SSID as a genuine identifier. We now consider the pos-
sibility of extracting additional information from the names of these SSIDs themselves. Indeed,
SSIDs are strings of characters designed to be meaningful for users and potentially contain in-
formation about the network owner or its users. More specifically, SSIDs often designate entities
such as institutions, individuals or locations [19]. Extraction of this information can be done
manually or could be automated.
Automatically extracting information from those SSIDs is close to the problem of the Named
Entity Recognition [12]. It is a subtask of information extraction to classify atomic elements
in text into predefined categories, such as, the names of persons, organizations and locations.
2We wrote a test application on Android 4.4 and find that BSSID field is returned as null by the system.
However, as per Android Doc, actual BSSID of Wi-Fi AP should be returned if it is set.
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SSIDs could be analyzed by such tools developed in this field to extract information as it is done
in [20] for short messages found on Twitter. This information can then be used, for example, by
advertisers to enrich the profile of the user to serve targeted ads.
4 Android Applications Analysis
We now analyze 100 most popular free applications in all 27 categories present on Google Play,
i.e., 2700 applications in total. We start by crawling Google Play using an unofficial API [4]
and look at the list of permissions required by these applications. For further analysis, we only
select applications that asks for both ACCESS_WIFI_STATE and INTERNET permissions and find
that a significant proportion of applications (1101 applications or 41% of 2700 applications)
require both of them. In practice, we find that almost all applications requiring ACCESS_WIFI-
_STATE permission also ask for INTERNET permission3.
We first statically analyze 998 APK files that we were able to download among 1101 appli-
cations requiring both permissions4 and then, only a subset of those applications are chosen for
dynamic analysis.
4.1 Static analysis
We use Androguard [1] for static analysis and our own Python scripts. Androguard is an open
source reverse engineering tool that is capable of analyzing Android APK files.
Table 2: Most commonly accessed methods of WifiManager class, in 998 applications.







As described in Section 2.2, ACCESS_WIFI_STATE permission is required to access various
methods related to Wi-Fi state and configuration. Table 2 presents the number of applications
accessing these methods. Indeed we find that 165 (∼17%) applications have just put this permis-
sion in their list of required permissions without really accessing any of the methods protected
by this permission. Actually these overprivileged applications also present a privacy-risk to the
users as their future revisions could easily exploit the resources protected by this permission.
Among these 6 methods protected by this permission, we chose to focus on the ones who
pose serious privacy risks to the user, namely getScanResults(), getConfiguredNetworks() and
getConnectionInfo(). The other three remaining methods are not privacy sensitive as they give
either information on the status of the Wi-Fi interface (getWifiState() and isWiFiEnabled()) or
information about the local IP configuration of the Wi-Fi interface (getDhcpInfo()). The three
chosen methods represents a privacy threat because, as seen in Section 3, they give direct or
indirect access to a number of user PII. With the help of getConnectionInfo() method call, an
application can access one of the device unique identifier, i.e., MAC Address of Wi-Fi chip). In
3There are only 5 applications who require ACCESS_WIFI_STATE permission but not INTERNET permission.
4103 APKs could not be downloaded due to some technical hurdle.
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Table 3: Correlation between privacy-sensitive methods of WifiManager class (out of 762)




the same way, getScanResults() returns the list of last scanned Wi-Fi APs that can be turned
into geolocation information with the aid of geolocation service. The last method, i.e., getCon-
figuredNetworks() returns the SSIDs among other information of all the APs to whom the user
has already connected or configured at some point of time in the past. As described in Section 3,
even if the returned list of last scanned surrounding Wi-Fi APs is almost up-to-date, we find that
196 applications (out of 1101 applications with ACCESS_WIFI_STATE and INTERNET permission)
also require CHANGE_WIFI_STATE permission and 136 applications explicitly start the scanning
before accessing this list of surrounding Wi-Fi APs.
From now on, our analysis focuses only on these three methods. Table 3 presents the correla-
tion between these methods based on the number of applications accessing different combinations
of these privacy sensitive methods. We can see that the most correlation exists between getScan-
Results() and getConnectionInfo() methods. Otherwise, there are 762 applications (∼76%, out of
998 applications tested) accessing, at least, one of these three privacy sensitive methods whereas
11 applications are accessing all 3 privacy sensitive methods.
In fact, we might expect applications in some categories to access these methods; for example,
it is expected that a Wi-Fi manager application (in Tools or App Widget categories) access
these methods, but not a cooking or wallpaper application. Figure 2 presents a category-wise
distribution of number of applications accessing these privacy-sensitive APIs out of a total of 100
applications analyzed in each category. This category-wise distribution is important to realize
why applications in certain categories would need access to ACCESS_WIFI_STATE permission.
It is the applications in ‘Game’ category that access the most information about currently
connected Wi-Fi APs through getConnectionInfo() method. It is justifiable in some cases, for
example, the networked game applications. Otherwise, for applications of all other categories,
there doesn’t seem to be any obvious reason to do so. Once again, it’s the applications in
‘Game’ category that access the most the list of surrounding Wi-Fi APs through getScanResults()
method. This time also, it could be justifiable in case of networked games. But the second
category in this list is ‘Social’ applications, which seems to be somewhat abnormal at first
glance. But as this information could be used to geolocalize the user, we speculate it as the
potential reason behind its access. Lastly, information about configured networks is most accessed
by applications in ‘Tools’ category which is, in fact, expected but is not justifiable at all, for
example, by applications in ‘Shopping’ category. Only one other category from which we can
imagine applications accessing this information is ‘App Widgets’. Overall (combining access of all
three methods), applications in ‘Game’ category are accessing the most these 3 privacy-sensitive
methods which is suspicious. Specifically, we see applications in some categories like lifestyle,
comics, app wallpaper, medical, finance, games, etc. accessing all three methods but, from whom
one might not expect at all to access these methods.
4.1.1 Access of privacy-sensitive methods by third-party code present inside appli-
cations
During the analysis of the applications, we have identified that the method calls were either
made by code written by the application developer (considered as first-party) or by the code
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Figure 2: Google Play category-wise distribution of applications based on 3 privacy-sensitive
method calls out of a total of 100 applications in each category.
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from third-party libraries (for example, advertisement, analytics, performance monitors, crash
reporters) included by the application developer. We therefore study the origin of the calls made
to these methods: if it made by code from first party or third party. If the class accessing
these various methods belong to a package whose name is the same as the application package
name, we mark it as the code written by the application developer; otherwise, it is considered as
third-party code.
Among these 762 applications who access at least one of these methods, 136 (i.e., 18%)
applications are such that it is only due to the third-party code present inside them. It highlights
the fact that this permission is being used by third-parties than the application developer in
a significant number of applications. We note that the access to an API call by third-party
code might be completely justified in some situations. However this is not always the case and
for instance inmobi.com and skyhookwireless.com call the Wi-Fi related methods in many



















Figure 3: Distribution of applications based on the party accessing privacy-sensitive methods
out of a total of 762 applications.
Figure 3 presents, for each of the three privacy-sensitive methods, the distribution whether a
first, third or both parties access these methods, and reveals that there are some applications in
which only the third-party code accesses these privacy-sensitive methods. This means that the
code written by the application developper in itself doesn’t require ACCESS_WIFI_STATE permis-
sion but it is, in fact, due to the third-party library code present inside the application. When
those method calls are made by a third party library, this can either be to secretly collect infor-
mation on the users or to provide a functionality to the application; for example, an application
developer or a third-party can use the code from skyhookwireless.com to retrieve device geolo-
cation without needing explicit dedicated geolocation permissions. It is worth mentioning that
skyhookwireless.com retrieves the list of surrounding Wi-Fi APs in 5 applications (Table 4).
In all cases, no matter first or third-party, deriving device geolocation without explicit user per-
mission is not legitimate and should be protected by the Android system. This also raises the
question of whether these third-parties ask application developers to put this permission in their
required list of permissions or they just make use of it when third-party code is included inside an
application requesting this permission. We cannot definitively know the answer of this question
but it’s possible that a geolocation service provider can just ask the developer to request ACCESS-
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_WIFI_STATE and INTERNET permissions, and assure the application developer to provide the
geolocation when requested.
Table 4: Top 10 third-parties in each category and their corresponding number of applications.
ConnectionInfo ScanResults ConfiguredNetworks
Third-party # Third-party # Third-party #
Third-party Apps Third-party Apps Third-party Apps
inmobi.com 74 inmobi.com 99 google.com 10
chartboost.com 55 domob.cn 9 mobiletag.com 4
tapjoy.com 49 mologiq.com 6 lechucksoftware.com 2
vungle.com 47 tencent.com 5 android.com 2
jirbo.com 43 skyhookwireless.com 4 Unibail.com 1
mobileapptracker.com 42 mobiletag.com 4 gpit.com 1
startapp.com 33 life360.com 2 citrix. 1
searchboxsdk.com 32 baidu.com 2 neom.de 1
crashlytics.com 30 mapbar.com 2 mcafee.com 1
amazon.com 29 Unibail.com 1 ookla.com 1
Table 4 presents top 10 third-parties in each category and their corresponding number of
applications in which they are present. Looking at the webpages of these third-parties, one may
understand the purpose of these third-parties in various applications. It seems like most of them
(inmobi.com, jirbo.com, vungle.com, startapp.com, chartboost.com) belong to Advertising and
Analytics business whereas others are different kinds of service providers (amazon.com, crash-
lytics.com, skyhookwireless.com). Here it is worth noting that skyhookwireless.com provides
geolocation service among other kind of services. With this service, an application can get the
location of the phone without explicitly requesting a geolocation related permission.
4.2 Dynamic analysis
We notice that 88 applications access, at least, two privacy-sensitive methods. We chose these
applications for dynamic analysis to know what information they are sending over network and
to which servers.
To perform this dynamic analysis, we use a modified system image of Android OS. Later,
applications are run on a device flashed with this modified system image of OS. Our modified
OS lets us track the behavior of a particular application. We modify the classes/methods of our
interest and log interesting method calls in a local SQLite database. Going in more details, we
modify some methods in WifiManager and WifiInfo classes along with network (both cleartext
and SSL) and data modification (encryption and hash) related methods. This generated SQLite
database is later analyzed with automatic scripts to know if a particular application is accessing
some information and leaking it over network. However, it is worth mentioning that other parts
of the OS remain untouched and the system is not different at all from Android in all other
aspects.
As already explained in Section 3, applications could infer a lot of information about the user
through the data available by this permission. To confirm these speculations, we test these 88
applications and check what information these applications (or third-party libraries included in
them) have already started to send to remote servers. And to our surprise, yes, both first and
third-parties have already started to do it.
Table 5 presents the list of servers to which privacy sensitive information obtained with
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the ACCESS_WIFI_STATE permission is sent. A number of third-parties present inside these
applications are collecting Wi-Fi MAC Address and sending it to their servers (even in cleartext
in some cases). Accessing Wi-Fi MAC address is really serious as it is a hardware-tied unique
identifier that remains the same all along the lifespan of the device and can be used to tie both
on-line and physical profile of a user (see Section 3.1). Looking at this list of servers in the Table 5
where Wi-Fi MAC address is sent, it seems like most of these servers belong to Advertising and
Analytics companies. This is not a surprise since those actors need a unique identifier to track
the users.
Also, both first (Badoo.com) and third-parties (inmobi.com) collect the SSID and BSSID of
the AP to which the device is connected. Let’s imagine them having this database of all users
and the Wi-Fi APs to whom they connect to. It might easily reveal various relationships between
users if two users connect to the same Wi-Fi AP. Depending on the type of Wi-Fi APs to which
users are connected to (for example, a protected Wi-Fi at home/work or at what time/location
they connect to), a lot of information could be derived about social links between users. As an
illustration, they can know users sharing a common flat among 10 users with same geolocation.
People living in a 10 story building might have approximately same geolocation retrieved by GPS
but this information can help them to know which users really share a flat/apartment.
Moreover, there are applications who get list of surrounding Wi-Fi APs and send it to re-
mote servers. For example, we found that Badoo and Foursquare applications sends the list of
surrounding Wi-Fi APs (SSIDs, BSSIDs, signal strength, etc.) to their respective servers. Here
it must be noted that both these applications have ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION permission and can
get precise device geolocation by the Android system. But still they send the list of scanned
nearby Wi-Fi APs to their servers. It leads to various speculations about the usage of this data.
Do they sell this data to other parties? As these applications have wide user-base, the database
built this way by these companies could be quite accurate; and there exists a possibilty that it
can be sold to other companies for money.
Lastly, we even found some third-parties (for example, inmobi.com, fastly.net) sending
5Wi-Fi MAC Address is hashed (SHA-1) before sending over network in clear-text.
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the list of surrounding Wi-Fi APs to their servers; they are present inside various applications.
Focusing on the communication inside various applications to inmobi.com server, we find that
inmobi.com library present inside these applications works in two modes: First, if it is included in
an application having ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION, it accesses the fine-grained geolocation retrieved
by the system along with nearby Wi-Fi APs (possibly to enrich their own database) and when
an application doesn’t have this permission, it derives device geolocation by querying their ge-
olocation server with the list of surrounding Wi-Fi APs. As an example, code from inmobi.com
inside SimSimi (com.ismaker.android.simsimi) application sends the list of surrounding Wi-Fi
APs to its server to derive device geolocation because this application doesn’t have neither
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION nor ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION permissions.
Finally, we didn’t encounter any application sending Wi-Fi configuration information over
the network (which is good for our privacy) but this might be the case in near future. Also,
it might be possible that our dynamic analysis technique couldn’t detect the leakage of this
information over network. In fact, one of the limitation of our technique is the fact that it
misses the detection of data leakage if the data is modified by the application itself using their
custom data modification methods instead of system methods (for example, methods or functions
provided by Android to encrypt/hash data). In all cases, we must take proper action now before
it is too late.
5 User perception
This section focuses on studying user perception of the ACCESS_WIFI_STATE permission. Section
3 and 4 have respectively demonstrated the potential privacy threats and the actual situation
today on Google Play. In fact, as studied in [16], it’s not always easy for users to know the kinds
of privacy-sensitive data could be made available by a permission. Android permissions are often
misunderstood by users. So we conduct an on-line survey involving 156 Android users to study
their perception of comparative privacy risks associated with ACCESS_WIFI_STATE permission
as well as regarding the privileges attributed to applications by this permission.
5.1 Survey description
User attitude towards privacy has been measured thanks to the Westin index [22], that is a set
of three questions often used in privacy studies, for example in [16], to evaluate users privacy
concerns and behavior on the Internet. Our survey has been implemented using Google Docs
and spread through social media and multiple mailing-lists. Spreading the survey in this manner
is not ideal (it clearly is a limitation of the study) due to possible sampling issues.
The survey is composed of 12 questions divided into 3 parts: the first part focuses on demo-
graphic information such as age, gender and professional category; the second part is concerning
user attitude towards privacy as well as to know since how long the user is using the Android
system; and finally, the third part is to evaluate the user perception of relative privacy risks
associated with several permissions and to know in detail how well users understand the implica-
tions of the ACCESS_WIFI_STATE permission. The permission were presented using a screenshot
of the permission’s description (as shown to the user by the Android system) rather than the
corresponding permissions’ names.
The third part of the survey starts with a series of questions where the respondent must
give an evaluation of the privacy risks associated with 5 selected Android permissions on a scale
of 1 to 10. Along with ACCESS_WIFI_STATE permission, we selected CHANGE_WIFI_STATE and
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE permissions in ‘Network Communications’ group to understand how
the user differentiates permissions belonging to the same group but giving access to different
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kinds of network-related data. We also selected ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION that is the permission
explicitly required by applications to get device geolocation. As device can also be geolocalized
indirectly by applications making use of the ACCESS_WIFI_STATE permission, ACCESS_FINE-
_LOCATION permission is selected to know how users evaluate the privacy risk of ACCESS_WIFI-
_STATE permission as compared to it. Finally, the READ_CONTACTS permission is selected as a
reference, because the name clearly signifies associated privacy risk.
Why comparison with ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION permission One might argue that the
geolocation information obtained using Wi-Fi APs might not be as precise/accurate as geolo-
calization obtained by GPS making use of ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION. However, in practice, Wi-Fi
based geolocation is quite accurate in cities [18]. A device could be tracked with a median
positioning error of 13-40 meters [11] as opposed to its conservative estimate of around 100m or
more. On the other hand, Blum et al. [9] reported mean location errors of 10-30 meters using the
GPS module of smartphones. This means that in dense Wi-Fi environments such as cities, the
geolocation information obtained from ACCESS_WIFI_STATE and ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION per-
missions are almost in the same order of accuracy. In addition, we must note that contrary to
GPS, Wi-Fi based geolocation can be used indoors and even if a user turns the GPS off in order
to save battery.
Table 6: Results of the last part of the survey about the fine understanding of the ACCESS_WIFI-
_STATE permission. Results for the correct answers are shown in green cells.
With ACCESS_WIFI_STATE permission and an Internet ac-
cess, an application can ...
Responses
True False Don’t know
✓ Check if the device is connected to the Internet through
Wi-Fi
89.74% 5.77% 4.49%
✗ Turn the Wi-Fi on or off 6.41% 85.26% 8.33%
✗ Get the list of your contacts 6.41% 86.54% 7.05%
✓ Get the list of surrounding Wi-Fi networks 75.00% 12.18% 12.82%
✓ Get the list of configured Wi-Fi networks 65.38% 16.67% 17.95%
✗ Connect the device to a Wi-Fi network 21.79% 67.31% 10.90%
✓ Get the device location 48.08% 41.67% 10.26%
✓ Get one of the device unique identifiers 46.79% 17.31% 35.90%
✓ Get some of the previously visited locations (even before
the App is installed)
35.90% 42.95% 21.15%
5.2 Results of the survey
In total, 190 users completed the survey from February 22 to 27, 2014. However, we discarded
responses from 34 users who have never used the Android system. So the results and analysis
presented below are based on the responses of 156 users who have, at least, some experience of
using the Android system.
Concerning the professional category of the respondents, more than 70% of the respondents
are ‘Scientific or Technical’, ‘Software’ or ‘Telecomunications’. The age declared by the respon-
dents was lower than 21 years in 18% of the case, between 21 and 30 years in 50%, and between
31 and 40 years for 21 %, leaving less than 10% above 40 years old. After computing the
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Westin index [22] of the respondents, we found that 47% of them are categorized as privacy
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Figure 4: Averge privacy risk rating for considered permissions.
The responses for the set of questions related to the privacy risks ratings associated with each
permission allowed us to have a comparative view of perceived privacy risks. Absolute average
privacy risk ratings given by users on a scale of 1 to 10 is presented in Figure 4. Overall, ACCESS-
_FINE_LOCATION and READ_CONTACTS are rated the highest for privacy risks whereas ACCESS-
_NETWORK_STATE and ACCESS_WIFI_STATE are rated the lowest. In fact, users rate ACCESS-
_WIFI_STATE lower in terms of privacy risks than ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION. This means that users
fail to perceive that device geolocalization could be derived from the information available to be
accessed using ACCESS_WIFI_STATE permission. As not only device geolocalization but a lot of
other PII could be obtained using ACCESS_WIFI_STATE permission as discussed in Section 3, it
should have been, in fact, rated higher in terms of privacy risks than ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION.
The results corresponding to the last question about fine understanding of ACCESS_WIFI-
_STATE permission are presented in table 6. The correctness of the answers greatly vary across
different questions. Thus we organized the questions asked into three groups based on the fraction
of correct answers they received.
A first group of questions have been correctly answered by the majority of the respondents
(more than 75% of correct answers). This first group includes questions about the basic func-
tionalities of the ACCESS_WIFI_STATE permission (e.g., checking Internet connectivity through
Wi-Fi and getting the list of surrounding Wi-Fi networks) as well as privileges that are not
granted by the permission (e.g., turning the Wi-Fi on or off and getting the list of contacts).
The second group of questions have a lower rate of correct answers but there is still a majority
(more than 60%) of respondents that gave the correct answer. It concerns the ability of the
application to access the list of configured networks and the ability to connect the device to a
Wi-Fi network.
Finally, the third group is the one that have received the lowest rate of correct answers (below
50%). Those questions concerns the ability of getting current or past geolocation information as
well as one of the device unique identifier. We remark that these poorly understood capabilities
are also the most privacy invasive. Even though a majority of the respondents failed to correctly
answer the last set of questions, there is still a significant proportion of respondents (more than
35% correct answers) who answered it correctly.
Focusing on the geolocation capability of the ACCESS_WIFI_STATE permission, we took a
closer look at the relative rating of the ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION compared to the ACCESS_WIFI-
_STATE permission. We only considered the respondents who have correctly answered that
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device geolocation could be obtained using the ACCESS_WIFI_STATE permission. One would
expect that, at least, these respondents would give the same rating to both ACCESS_WIFI-
_STATE and ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION permissions. However, we found that this group of re-
spondents rate ACCESS_WIFI_STATE permission 2.55 points less risky in terms of privacy than
the ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION. This means that despite a clear understanding of the geolocation
capability, respondents tend to consider the ACCESS_WIFI_STATE less risky than the ACCESS-
_FINE_LOCATION permission.
6 Related work
Inference of private information by application on the Android system have been studied in [23].
This work focuses on the exploitation of public information available on the the Android system,
i.e., data that do not require any permission to be accessed. In particular, they show that some
PII (such as, geolocation, driving route, identity) can be inferred from the public information
made available to be accessed for applications by the Android system. We note that getting
device geolocation is common in both ours and this study. However, in [23], it can only be
obtained when the device is connected to a Wi-Fi network, whereas in our work, it can be
obtained as long as the Wi-Fi interface is enabled.
The problem of overprivileged applications has been studied in [15]. The study shows that
a third of the applications are requesting more permissions than actually required. One of the
proposed explanations is the confusion between permission names, which is typically the case
for network related permission such as ACCESS_WIFI_STATE and ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE. Our
results are in line with those findings as we have identified 17% of the applications requesting
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE permission without really using it.
The user comprehension of Android permissions has been studied by Felt et al. in [16], using a
questionnaire as we did. The authors considered a total of 11 permissions including READ_PHONE-
_STATE and CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE, but they did not consider the ACCESS_WIFI_STATE nor the
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION permissions. Like our study of the ACCESS_WIFI_STATE permission,
[16] shows that many users have a poor understanding of the Android permission system.
7 Conclusion and Potential
Solutions
The paper, first, presented what PII could be directly obtained or indirectly derived from data
made available to be accessed for applications by the ACCESS_WIFI_STATE permission. We
showed that a large number of applications request this permission and then, with the help of an
online survey, we found that users often fail to perceive privacy implications associated with this
permission. Our analysis of a representative set of most popular applications in each category
on Google Play revealed that a number of both first and third-parties have already started to
exploit this permission to access or derive user PII.
The results of this study call for changes in the Android permission system: first the access
to Wi-Fi scan results should be protected with location permissions; then the ACCESS_WIFI-
_STATE permission description should indicate the various PII that can be directly obtained
or inferred from it; finally, the ACCESS_WIFI_STATE permission should be placed in the list of
dangerous permissions as it is more privacy-sensitive than some of the permissions already in the
list.
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